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As we near the close of the twentieth century, communist
regimes have collapsed and the productivity of capitalism
is universally acclaimed. In all the Western democracies,
welfare state institutions are being challenged. The chal-
lenge is, arguably, the most fundamental in the United
States. Proposals to privatize public education and old-
age insurance are now mainstream. The 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation
Act represents the most recent, and is likely to be the
most influential, change in public policy for the poor. By
eliminating the historical entitlement to welfare, and
devolving responsibility for welfare programs to the states,
the Personal Responsibility Act dramatically changes the
nature, level, and locus of government responsibility for
the poor. Other policy changes—such as the creation of
the Children’s Health Insurance Program and Child Care
and Development Block Grant—have expanded resources
and state-level discretion for the provision of support.
Supporters of the retrenchment and devolution of
federal programs predict that these changes will improve
the fortunes of the most disadvantaged Americans and
help close the growing gap between the rich and the poor.
Critics predict that these same changes will harm the poor
and increase inequality. The disagreement stems, in part,
from different expectations about the intermediate impact
of devolution on government, community, and family
systems. Some observers argue that government has dis-
placed support from the family, community, and voluntary
sectors; they expect government retrenchment to enhance
the capacity and contribution from these nongovernmental
systems. Others argue that government has a unique
capacity to support disadvantaged populations and to pro-
mote greater equality in economic and social outcomes; they
fear that government retrenchment will create a level of need
that will overwhelm private systems and force individuals
to turn to unreliable and unacceptable alternatives.
Efforts to confirm or disprove predictions such as
these are creating new opportunities, along with new chal-
lenges, for scholars who are interested in questions about
economic security and equality. New opportunities are
arising with the “natural experiments” that are created as
state and local governments revise, redesign, and reduce a
variety of income assistance and social service programs.
New challenges are arising as analysts attempt to track the
rapidly changing policy landscape and collect data with
which to evaluate the impact of the changes.
Marcia K. Meyers is the associate director and Irwin Garfinkel the chair of the
New York City Social Indicators Survey Center of Columbia University. The
views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.150 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999
The New York City Social Indicators Survey (SIS)
project represents one effort to track the consequences of
policy reform and devolution for inequality and well-being
in the largest and most diverse city in the United States.
The project uses a telephone survey to collect data from a
repeated cross-sectional sample of the entire city population.
The survey will collect detailed information on families’
economic resources, assets, external support, and health
and well-being. By analyzing these data by population and
over time, we hope to address questions that are at the core
of current debates about inequality in the United States:
How great is inequality? Does income inequality exaggerate,
or reflect, inequality in material and social living conditions,
health, and well-being? Is inequality on these dimensions
growing or shrinking? And what effect have devolution
and social policy “reform” had on the magnitude of income
and other forms of inequality?
In the following sections, we present first-year
findings from the project. We begin with an overview of
the issues that motivated the project and a brief summary
of our measures and data-collection methods. The next
sections use data collected in 1997 to tell the story of
income and outcome inequality in the city—first, in terms
of comparisons between the well-being of New Yorkers and
the rest of the U.S. population; second, in terms of the
well-being of poor and economically secure residents of the
city. We conclude by describing future research plans for
the Social Indicators project.
BACKGROUND
The New York City Social Indicators Survey demonstrates
the use of social indicators—repeated, population-based
measures of economic, social, and health outcomes—to
answer questions about inequality and well-being. Social
indicators were widely embraced in the 1960s, fueled by
the recognition that social and health policymakers needed
better tools for monitoring and reporting on social and
health conditions (Carley 1981). Government agencies and
academic institutions took advantage of a vastly improved
capacity for data collection and storage to amass information
on a variety of social and economic processes and outcomes.
Analysts hoped to use these data to document trends and
progress toward increasing well-being and reducing ine-
quality in income, health, and other outcomes. These efforts
largely disappointed their sponsors’ highest hopes. Social
indicators based on aggregate data—such as poverty rates,
infant mortality, or child abuse and crime victimization
reports—proved to be both insufficiently sensitive, as mea-
sures of policy impact, and overly aggregated, as indicators
of the well-being of populations at the subnational level
(Andrews 1989; Bulmer 1989; Johnston 1989).
A number of factors have combined to fuel a
resurgence of interest in the use of social indicators to track
well-being and inequality. Dramatic changes in welfare,
health, and social policies are raising questions about
whether these reforms will reduce or exacerbate the trend
toward greater inequality of income and of outcomes across
groups. Meanwhile, the devolution of social and health
policies downward, to lower levels of government, and
outward, to new government and private entities, has
increased the need for reliable measurement of outcomes at
the subnational level.
Even as demand for more and better data on
income and other outcomes has grown, however, traditional
measures and approaches have come under growing criticism.
Existing outcome data—available from public administrative
records and household surveys—are limited in terms of
what is measured, how well it is measured, the extent to
which various measures can be aggregated at the individual
and household level, and the possibilities for desegregating
these analyses to policy-relevant geographic areas.
MEASUREMENT AND DATA ISSUES
Disagreements begin with the question of what to measure.
The most widely used indicator of economic well-being and
inequality is household income relative to need, measured
in terms of the federal poverty threshold. As a measure of
income, the official poverty measure, based on current
before-tax cash income, is criticized for both over- and
underestimating family resources (Citro and Michael
1995). The poverty measure overestimates resources because
it fails to adjust for nonelective expenditures—such as taxes,
medical costs, and work expenses—that reduce disposable
income. At the same time, by excluding in-kind transfersFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999 151
such as Food Stamps or housing assistance, the poverty
measure underestimates resources that directly improve
economic living conditions. The threshold used in the
official definition of poverty has also been criticized. Based
on a formula established in the 1950s, the threshold is
variously criticized for failing to reflect changes in
consumption patterns, differences in the rate of inflation
for essential expenditures such as housing, and geo-
graphic differences in the cost of living (Ruggles 1990;
Citro and Michael 1995). Calculations of both income and
the threshold are also highly sensitive to measures of prices,
and some analysts argue that current measures overstate
inflation and the extent and growth of poverty and ine-
quality since the 1960s (see Mayer and Jencks [1995] and
Mayer [1997]).
Even if these measurement problems can be
solved, many analysts argue that income poverty will still
be a poor indicator for tracking the underlying dimensions
of economic security and inequality. Using data from a
Chicago survey, Mayer and Jencks (1988), for example,
find that a family’s official income-to-needs ratio (poverty)
explained only 24 percent of variance in the amount of
material hardship they experienced on dimensions as basic
as hunger, housing adequacy, and medical care. The poverty
measure may be an especially flawed indicator of the effec-
tiveness of government efforts to improve economic
well-being and reduce inequality. Since the mid-1960s,
the major growth in government anti-poverty spending
has been for in-kind benefits—through Food Stamps,
Medicaid, and housing programs—and for other social
service and human capital programs. It is argued by
many that, while these programs have made important
contributions to the well-being of poor families and may
have helped close the gap in material security between the
poor and the nonpoor, their success has been underesti-
mated because the income poverty is not sensitive to
changes in material well-being (for example, see Mayer
and Jencks [1988] and Jorgenson [1998]).
In light of these problems, some scholars have
recommended replacing income measures with measures of
household expenditure or consumption. Household-level
surveys typically find that reported consumption is higher
than reported income, and analysts using consumption or
expenditure data typically find lower rates of poverty and
inequality across households—suggesting that noncash
resources may in fact help close some of the gap in cash
income between poor and nonpoor households (Cutler and
Katz 1992; Slesnick 1993). Consumption measures also
capture differences across families who, while they have
similar incomes, have quite different consumption needs.
Consumption studies comparing the welfare and working
poor, for example, reveal that the latter are often worse off (at
the same income level) because they have higher nonelective
expenses such as transportation, child care, and private
medical insurance (Passero 1996; Edin and Lein 1997).
Even more direct indicators of economic well-being
are provided by various measures of material conditions.
Using eight national surveys, Federman et al. (1996), for
example, demonstrate the worst material well-being of
poor—relative to nonpoor—children by comparing the
groups on dimensions ranging from housing quality to
crime victimization, disabilities, hunger, and the presence of
books and computers in the home. While direct measures
such as these cannot resolve the normative issue of how
much material inequality or distress is “too much,” they
can begin to give concrete meaning to the magnitude of
the difference between groups and trends over time. Mayer
and Jencks (1995) and Mayer (1997), for example, have
argued that while differences in material circumstances of
poor and nonpoor children remain large, inequality in
some measures of material well-being has actually declined
in magnitude over time. Using multiple data sources, they
find that between 1969 and 1989, while adjusted incomes
declined for the poorest families with children, some measures
of concrete well-being—such as housing crowding,
housing quality, and access to health care—actually
improved. Other measures—such as home ownership,
access to a car, and neighborhood safety—declined during
the same period.
A final measurement issue concerns the use of
outcomes other than economic well-being to estimate the
gap between advantaged and disadvantaged individuals.
Economic resources and material deprivation are important
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They are useful predictors of other outcomes as well,
because poor individuals, particularly children, have far
worse prospects than nonpoor individuals on a range of
outcomes, from physical health to educational attainment
and socioemotional functioning (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn
1997). Even the best measures of economic well-being are
imperfect proxies for these outcomes, however. To track
well-being and inequality on health, developmental,
social, and other outcomes, it is critical to measure these
outcomes directly. We would ideally like across-group and
over-time data not only on economic and material circum-
stances, but also on outcomes such as health, disabilities,
educational success, socioemotional adjustment, mental
health, and family functioning.
These outcomes are arguably the most important
indicators for evaluating well-being and inequality. They
may also be the best measures of the impact of public pro-
grams, from health insurance to preschool, that are designed
to improve the life chances of “at-risk” individuals. They are
also the most difficult and expensive indicators to measure
and track. As a result, existing individual-level outcome
indicators have a number of important limitations.
One of the most severe limitations is that of the
data. By far the largest source of data are the administrative
records of government programs. These records provide a
wealth of information that has been used in recent years to
describe the characteristics and circumstances of individuals
in public welfare, mental health, child welfare, and other
public systems. Although vast, these administrative data
are typically quite limited, both by the sample observed
(including only individuals who receive government ser-
vices) and by the type of information collected (designed
for program management rather than for tracking individual
outcomes). One consequence can be compromises in data
quality—data that are either insensitive measures (not
reflecting the construct they are intended to measure) or
biased by missing data or nonrepresentative samples
(Brown and Corbett 1997). Poor data quality has created
substantial problems, to use some recent examples, when
receipt of an intervention has been substituted for the
underlying condition (such as using child-abuse reports as
a proxy for child maltreatment); when trends in the data
have unclear or ambiguous meaning (for example, recent
declines in Food Stamp and Medicaid caseloads); or when
data have been available only for a nonrandom subset of the
population of interest (for instance, in the use of state
employment tax records to measure employment among
welfare exiters).
Household-level surveys are the primary alterna-
tive to administrative data, and a number of population
surveys conducted at the national level collect data on
individual outcomes ranging from economic security (such
as the Current Population Survey) to material well-being
(such as the American Housing Survey and the Survey of
Income and Program Participation), neighborhood quality
(such as the National Crime Victimization Survey), child
adjustment and family functioning (such as the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics and National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth), and health (such as the National Maternal
and Infant Health Survey).
National surveys are a rich source of information
about how individuals and households are faring. But single-
purpose surveys remain severely limited for the purpose of
tracking multiple outcomes simultaneously at the individual
level. For example, in order to answer the question “What
does it mean to be poor in America?” Federman et al. (1996)
drew upon eight different national surveys. Although use-
ful, this analysis is still limited because, as the authors
point out, surveys that address only one or a few aspects of
well-being cannot be used to understand either the correla-
tions across various dimensions of well-being or the accu-
mulation of risk factors at the individual level. This is a
particularly severe limitation as studies of inequality move
beyond simple income comparisons. To understand what it
means to be poor, for example, or how the poor are faring
relative to the nonpoor, it is important to understand
whether a single indicator of hardship (such as hunger or
housing adequacy) represents a household-level choice
about the allocation of limited resources, or whether it is
one aspect of an accumulation of hardship across multiple
dimensions. With a few notable exceptions, population
surveys do not provide this range of measures.
The use of national surveys to study inequality and
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population samples, or specialized subsamples, are needed
to compare well-being across groups, and samples of some
of the most vulnerable groups—such as families with
young children, or low-income workers, or insecurely
housed individuals—are often too small for this purpose.
Opportunities to link outcomes to policy variation are
also limited, because most national data sets do not have
sufficiently large or representative samples for the geo-
graphic areas in which policy is now being formulated—
the state, county, and even local levels.
THE NEW YORK CITY SOCIAL 
INDICATORS SURVEY
What is needed for the study of policy reform, well-
being, and inequality—and what the New York City
Social Indicators Survey is designed to provide—is micro-
level outcome data that measure a range of critical out-
comes, over time, across the entire population, and within
a single policy jurisdiction. The SIS will be administered
every two years, using a repeated cross-sectional sampling
design. The SIS measures family and individual well-
being on a wide range of economic and noneconomic
dimensions.
We begin with individual and family assets—the
human, financial, and social resources that individuals
accumulate starting in childhood. They are a critical com-
ponent of well-being because they constitute not only the
wealth of the present but also “capital” for the future. The
SIS measures include human assets (health and disability,
educational achievement), financial assets (net worth, debt,
home ownership, equity), and social assets (access to capital
in an emergency, reliance on neighbors, neighborhood
support for children).
Because the well-being of children is a particularly
important indicator of social health and welfare, the SIS
includes a wide array of child outcome indicators. These are
supplemented by measures of parenting practices and family
routines that are predictive of child outcomes. Specific
measures include child outcomes (child health and disability,
child socioemotional development, child school progress,
adolescent risk behaviors) and parenting practices and
organization of family routines (supervision of children,
familiarity with children’s friends, organization of family
meals, reading to children).
Human assets and child outcomes provide good
indicators of well-being in the present and children’s devel-
opment of human capital for the future. But New Yorkers
live in the present. SIS indicators of family living conditions
describe the immediate life circumstances of families and their
members. These measures cover both economic conditions
(income, difficulty paying utility bills, income-related
hunger) and social conditions (housing quality and crowding,
crime victimization, neighborhood quality and safety).
Individuals and their families are never entirely
self-sufficient. All rely on some forms of external support to
assure their well-being, and the availability and quality
of these supports are important factors in security and
well-being. The source of support—from government,
family, community, or the workplace—has other implications
for both the adequacy of support and for families’ patterns of
reliance. To capture these dimensions, the SIS includes
additional measures of institutional support (health
insurance coverage, quality and safety of children’s school,
use of formal child care) and financial and concrete assis-
tance with child care, educational, medical, housing and
food needs from government, family, community pro-
grams, and government.
The SIS will be used to collect these measures
from a random sample of all New York City households on
a biannual basis. Each data set will be a fully representative
cross-section of the city’s population; over time, samples
may be combined to increase the sample of small subpopu-
lations. The data will be used in a variety of ways to
describe, track, and analyze well-being and inequality in
the city over the coming years.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
In 1997, the first round of SIS data was collected from a
random sample of 2,224 New York City households,
using random digit dialing techniques. The sample was
designed to be representative of all families in the city.
We have used statistical methods to correct the final
sample for potential sampling biases. We have corrected
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regular phone service by giving extra weight to those
who have intermittent service. Other biases, including
disproportionate participation by more highly educated
respondents, have been corrected by post-stratification
weighting using U.S. Census Bureau data. Some limita-
tions in the representativeness of the sample could not be
overcome. Most notable is the exclusion of individuals who
could not be interviewed in English or Spanish. Of all
households within the random sampling frames who
were determined to be eligible for the survey, nearly half
(48 to 49 percent) refused to participate. Although this
may cause some unmeasured biases in the final sample,
once the data are correctly weighted, the sample very
closely approximates Census Bureau data for the city on
major demographic and economic characteristics.
Some specific characteristics of the New York
City Social Indicators Survey influence the comparability
of its data to other data sources. First, we consider respon-
dents to be partnered whether or not they are legally mar-
ried to their domestic partners. Estimates from the survey
may therefore show higher rates of two-adult and two-
parent families than estimates based on other definitions
and data sources. Second, we count all individuals in our
survey as part of a family. Individuals without partners or
resident children are treated as a “family of one,” even if
they are sharing a residence with other non-nuclear fam-
ily members (such as adult children) or nonrelated adults
(such as roommates). This definition differs from the one
used in many statistics relying on Census data (such as
the poverty rate) that are based on households that count
all adults and children related by blood or marriage who
share a residence. For extended families sharing a resi-
dence, the SIS definition does not assume shared
resources. Our unit of analysis will therefore count fewer
resources and may produce higher estimates of financial
hardship for these families. Finally, the respondent for the
survey is always a randomly selected adult in the family
unless there are resident children, in which case we select
the primary caregiver for those children. Our adult
respondents are therefore more likely to be female than
those in other data sources.
FIRST-YEAR FINDINGS
The inaugural report of the New York City Social Indica-
tors Survey provides a first look at the well-being of New
Yorkers using a wide array of measures. Like the Dickens
novel, A Tale of Two Cities, we find that for some New
Yorkers this is the best of times and for others it is perhaps
the worst of times. In a city as full of contrasts as New
York, the story is inevitably even more complex than this.
The story of New York City in 1997 is not a tale of two
cities, but a tale of many cities.
NEW YORK CITY AND THE UNITED STATES
We find both good news and bad news about two of the
most fundamental human assets of New Yorkers: health
and education (Table 1). The news about health is good.
More than three-fourths of adults report either good or
excellent health. Even more encouraging is the finding that
more than 90 percent report their children’s health to be
good to excellent. Comparable data from nationally repre-
sentative surveys suggest that New Yorkers are about as
healthy as Americans are on the whole.1
With respect to education, there is less cause for
cheer and, in fact, cause for worry. The good news is that
the majority of New York children are at or above the
grade level for their age. Although children seem to be
doing pretty well in school on average, the fact that as
many as 16 percent are falling behind or in special educa-
tion is cause for concern. Even more worrisome is the fact
that school achievement declines steadily with age. While
88 percent of New York children under age ten are at grade
level, only 79 percent of those between ages fifteen and
eighteen are doing as well. The large number of New York
children who are falling behind as they approach graduation is
consistent with indicators of educational achievement
among adults in the city. The proportion of New York
adults with college or post-graduate degrees is about the
same as the national average of 22 percent.2 But almost
one-third of the New York City adults in our survey had
only a high school education and about the same propor-
tion had not completed high school—a rate much higher
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Due to small sample sizes and measurement
difficulties, our data on financial assets must be interpreted
cautiously. Even the most sophisticated surveys of wealth
tend to understate the true value of financial assets, and
the simple measures used in this survey are likely to
undercount wealth even more. Respondents who refuse to
answer sensitive questions about their family finances
exacerbate the problem. Keeping in mind these limitations,
the SIS begins to paint a portrait of inequality in the
city.
Table 1
SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR NEW YORK CITY, 1997
Indicator Response Percent Indicator Response Percent
Adult’s health is... Excellent 30 Family... Owns home 26
Good 46 Rents home 67
Fair 19 Is just “staying there” 8
Poor 5
Family income relative to poverty line... More than 10 times poverty 5
Adult has condition that... No limiting condition 81 Between 4 and 10 times 22
Limits work 10 Between 2 and 4 times 24
Prevents work 9 Between 1 and 2 times 20
At or below poverty  29
Adult’s highest education is... College degree or more 21
Some post–high school  19 Due to (lack of) money, utility bills were... Always paid on time 82
Only high school/GED 31 Sometimes late 17
Less than high school  30 Utilities shut off 1
Child’s health is... Excellent 63 Due to (lack of) money, family members... Never went hungry 94
Good 30 Sometimes went hungry 7
Fair 5
Poor 1 Family’s housing is... Not substandard 84
Substandard 16
Child has disability that limits... No limiting condition 94
Activities a little 3 Rooms per person in family housing... 2.2 or more 33
Activities a lot 3 Between 1 and 2.2 55
Less than 1  12
Child is... At or above grade level 84
Below grade level 16 Adult rates neighborhood as... Very good 29
Pretty good 36
Parent reports child has... No behavior problems 42 Only fair 27
At least one problem 29 Poor  9
Two or more problems 29
Family could borrow from a relative
  or friend... At least $10,000  20
Walking in neighborhood at night,
  adult feels... Very safe 30
$1,000 but not $10,000 31 Somewhat safe 43
$100 but not $1,000 33 Somewhat unsafe 14
Not even $100 16 Very unsafe  13
Family’s total assets are... $100,001 or more 16 In prior year, family members were... Not crime victims 89
$5,001 to $100,000 21 Robbed or burglarized 11
$1 to $5,000 19
$0 or negative  44
Source:  Garfinkel and Meyers (1999).156 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999
In terms of the good news, it is noteworthy that
16 percent of New York families report a net worth,
including home equity and other forms of wealth, of more
than $100,000. Many New York families are clearly doing
very well. This good news is tempered, however, by the fact
that comparable data for the country as a whole indicate
that as many as 30 percent of all families have assets in
excess of $100,000.4 The worst news about the financial
assets of New Yorkers is the very large proportion of
families who have zero or negative net worth. Forty-four
percent of families report no assets. One-half of these families
have no net worth and the other half owe more than they own.
This proportion is much higher than the 12 percent of all U.S.
families that report zero or negative wealth,5 suggesting that
on average, New York families lag well behind the rest of the
country in their accumulation of assets.
One important factor in the gap between New
York and the rest of the country are the much lower rates of
home ownership in the city. Home equity is the most
common form of wealth for U.S. families, but nearly three-
quarters of New Yorkers do not own their homes. This is
more than twice the national average of 35 percent.6
Access to capital from family and friends is a form
of social asset. In small amounts, loans from family or
friends may be a critical form of support when families face
a financial crisis or need to make a routine transition such
as a residential move. In larger amounts, such loans can
provide opportunities for starting small businesses and
other forms of investment. About half of New York families
believe they have access to at least a small financial cushion
of at least $1,000; 20 percent have access to $10,000 or
more. In sharp contrast, as many as 16 percent of fami-
lies do not believe they could borrow even $100 in an
emergency.
Given the growth of income inequality, some
observers have described New York City as “hollow in the
middle.” Our indicators of human, financial, and social
assets suggest that the city may be better described as
“bloated at the bottom” by the large number of families
who lack basic education and who have failed to accumulate
any financial wealth. Indicators of current economic well-
being tell a very similar story.
At the top of the income distribution, 5 percent of
New Yorkers live in families with incomes greater than ten
times the federal poverty level—the same proportion that
is observed in the nation as a whole.7 But the 29 percent of
New York families with incomes that fall below the federal
poverty threshold is nearly twice the 15 percent of U.S.
families who fall below the threshold when we apply the same
definition of family resources to Census Bureau data. In com-
parison to conventional Census Bureau estimates that
count all household income, the New York City Social
Indicators Survey measures family income by counting
only the resources of nuclear family members (respondent,
spouse/partner and dependent children); this calculation
overestimates poverty by approximately 4 percentage points.
Nevertheless, the evidence that New York City is bloated
at the bottom is unambiguous.
Rates of income poverty correspond closely to
compromises in living conditions. The rate of income-
related hunger is twice as high in the city as it is in the
nation.8 Given its scarcity, it is not surprising that housing
inadequacies are even more acute than hunger in the city.
Housing problems are also considerably more common in
New York City than in the nation as a whole. The good
news is that the large majority of New York families live
in housing that is not considered substandard or over-
crowded. But 16 percent of New York City families do live
in housing with major structural problems or utility
breakdowns.9 Twelve percent of families also live in dwell-
ings that have less than one room per household member.
This is four times the national average.10
Physical security is one of the distinguishing
features of a civil society and a powerful indicator of the
quality of life. That crime rates have dropped substan-
tially in New York City in recent years is certainly good
news.11 The SIS reveals that 11 percent of New York
City families were victims of a robbery or burglary in
the prior year, only slightly higher than the national
average of 9 percent.12 Whether that is good or bad news is
unclear. By international standards, the United States con-
tinues to have very high crime rates. However, 30 percent of
adults interviewed for the survey  report that they feel
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another 43 percent consider themselves at least somewhat
safe. This is encouraging news about the city. And it provides
further evidence that the experience of crime for New
Yorkers may not be dramatically different from that
for Americans more generally: In response to a similar
question in a 1997 Gallup poll, 61 percent of U.S. residents
indicated that they were not afraid to walk near their
homes at night.13
The well-being of New Yorkers depends not only
on their economic resources but also on the security and
quality of a variety of external supports. Some of these
supports—such as health insurance—are provided by both
government and market institutions. Others—such as
schools—are provided through an even more diverse com-
bination of public, community, and religious institutions.
While New Yorkers describe themselves as generally satisfied
with many of these institutions, there appear to be serious
problems of access and quality in some areas.
Health insurance coverage is one of the most
important external supports for families and, for New
Yorkers, one of the most problematic. Slightly more than
two-thirds of New York families were fully insured for the
whole year through either private health plans or govern-
ment programs such as Medicaid and Medicare. In nearly
one-quarter of families, some or all of the family members
lacked insurance when contacted. In another 9 percent,
at least one family member had gone without insurance
at some point in the prior year. These figures are consid-
erably higher than the 14 to 15 percent of U.S. residents
who are uninsured at a point in time, and the additional
6 to 7 percent of adults who lack insurance for at least
one month out of the year.14
However, the problem of obtaining health insurance
appears to be much more acute for New Yorkers than the
quality of the coverage they obtain. Among those who have
some kind of health insurance coverage, about half describe
themselves as very satisfied with their plan and another
third are at least somewhat satisfied. New York parents are
even more positive about the school their child attends.
About two-thirds of parents agree that their child’s school
is safe and provides a good education; another one-quarter
somewhat agree.
THE POOR AND NONPOOR: INEQUALITY
OF INCOME AND OF OUTCOMES
Taking the “average” temperature of New York tells us
that the city is different from the rest of the country. On
average, its residents are poorer in income and assets, less
well educated, less likely to be homeowners, more likely to
be living in overcrowded housing, less likely to have health
insurance, and less positive, overall, about their neighbor-
hoods. But New York is not a city of averages; it is a city of
diversity and extremes. The myth of America as a melting
pot has been pervasive. The New York City Social Indica-
tors Survey documents a different reality: In terms of
assets, living conditions, and experience with the city’s
institutions, the diverse groups of New York City do not
melt together, but remain far apart.
Some of the starkest differences are revealed when
we compare New Yorkers who differ by income. Over one-
quarter of all New York families have incomes at or below
the federal poverty threshold and another one-fifth are near-
poor, with incomes between one and two times the poverty
threshold. Slightly more than one-quarter of families, in
contrast, might be considered “affluent,” or at least eco-
nomically secure, with incomes at least four times the
poverty threshold. Inequality between these families is great,
not only in income, but in measures of well-being ranging
from living conditions to the accumulation of assets.
In terms of human assets, the poor and near-poor
of New York are struggling indeed (Table 2). The respon-
dent in one-third or more of these families reports fair
to poor health; one-quarter also report a work-limiting
disability. The gap between rich and poor is vast: The odds
that a poor adult is in poor health are more than eight
times those of an affluent adult; his or her odds of being
disabled are more than ten times greater. Educational dis-
advantage is also highly concentrated. In half of poor and
near-poor families, one or both adults lack the equivalent
of a high school education.
It is difficult to sort out the causal sequence
linking adults’ human assets and poverty. Poor health
and education may be a consequence of income poverty
and restricted opportunity; they are also an important con-
tributing factor to low earnings and poverty. In the case of158 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999
children, however, the significance of compromises in
human assets is much more straightforward. It cannot be
argued that children’s poor health or education cause their
income poverty. Compromises in children’s human assets
are much more clearly a consequence of poverty and, per-
haps more importantly, a predictor of economic difficulties
in the future.
On the whole, children in poor New York families
are much healthier than adults. Children are also much less
likely to be disabled than adults. It is good news that as many
as 85 to 90 percent of poor children are in good health and free
from activity-limiting problems. This suggests that children
in poor families may not have paid as great a price as adults in
terms of their health status. Whether this bodes equally well
for the future depends on how well these children fare as they
age. Here the news is not so reassuring.
The prevalence of childhood physical health,
mental health, and learning problems generally
increases with age. The jump is particularly sharp dur-
ing the school years, when children are identified for
special services within the school system. National data
show, for example, that 2 percent of children under age
three have identified disabilities, and the proportion
rises steadily with age until it reaches 6 percent of
school-age children and 9 percent of adolescents (Aron,
Loprest, and Steuerle 1996). A similar pattern is evident
in the New York data (Table 3). Among all children, the
proportion with some form of health problem or disabil-
ity increases substantially from early childhood to ado-
lescence. This increase would be expected, as health and
learning problems are manifested and diagnosed through-
out childhood.
Table 2
SOCIAL INDICATORS BY INCOME RELATIVE TO POVERTY
Indicator Percentage Poor  Percentage Near-Poor Percentage Middle Class Percentage Affluent Odds Ratio: Poor versus Affluent
Respondent in fair to poor health 35 43 11 6 8.0
Respondent disabled 28 22 10 4 10.2
Any adults without high school 51 51 13 6 15.4
Child in fair to poor healtha 8 8 5 5 1.6
Child disableda 13 9 6 6 2.3
Child not at or above grade level 33 10 7 7 6.6
Child has behavior problem(s)a 38 26 25 22 2.1
Zero or negative assets 69 44 35 25 6.7
Could not borrow $100 33 11 8 4 10.9
Hunger in prior year 11 4 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Late utility payments in prior year 25 24 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Overcrowded housing 23 12 6 4 6.5
Substandard housing 27 14 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Family members victims of crimea 11 8 12 8 1.3
Property (break in) 4 2 7 7 0.5
Personal (robbery) 7 7 6 2 4.3
Feel unsafe in neighborhood 36 40 21 13 3.8
Rate neighborhood fair to poor 49 38 31 16 5.1
Adult(s) lacks health insurance  26 23 19 18 1.6
Child(ren) lacks health insurance  20 30 11 6 4.0
Parent rates child’s school as poor 22 24 16 12 2.1
Preschool child not in formal care 81 53 57 51 4.3
Source:  Garfinkel and Meyers (1999).
Note:  Unless otherwise noted, group differences are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
aGroup differences are not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
Memo:
Unweighted number 287 220 406 435
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What should not be expected is that as the preva-
lence of childhood difficulties grows, so too does the gap
between the advantaged and disadvantaged. Translated
into the language of odds, among children under age six,
the odds that a poor child is disabled or in bad health are
about the same as those of an affluent child; among older
children, the odds of disability and health problems are
nearly two to three times greater among poor children.
Poor children’s school performance and behavioral
adjustment are also far behind those of their more affluent
peers (Table 2). On the whole, children in New York are
doing pretty well. Problems are highly concentrated, how-
ever, among children in the poorest families. In comparison
to affluent children, the odds that a poor child is behind at
least one grade are more than six times greater; the odds
that he or she has adjustment problems are two times
greater. Like health, school and behavior problems are
worse among older children, and the difference between
advantaged and disadvantaged children is wider. By age
seventeen, the odds of being behind a grade are more
than six times greater for poor children than for affluent
children, and the odds of having behavior problems are
more than three times greater.
These data show that poor adults and children in
New York are lagging far behind their richer counterparts
in terms of human assets. We should not be surprised to
find that poor families are also far behind in the accumulation
of any financial assets. Over two-thirds of poor New
York families report zero or negative assets. Families at
the bottom of the economic ladder are also poor in terms
of access to resources that might help them weather a
financial crisis or routine transition, such as a move or the
start of a new job. One-third of the poorest families do not
have access to even $100 in emergency funds. This is a
sobering reminder of how disadvantage accumulates: Poor
families are disadvantaged not only in their own resources
but also in their ability to get, or give, financial help to
kith and kin.
Financial insufficiency translates into a number of
compromises in the economic and living conditions of the
poorest New Yorkers. Food insufficiency is highly concen-
trated among the poor, affecting 11 percent of families.
One-quarter of the poor have faced difficulty with utility
payments. About one in four poor New York families is
also living in overcrowded housing and 27 percent live in
housing that had serious structural, plumbing, or heating
problems.
Income is less predictive of crime victimization.
The SIS suggests that the much-heralded drop in the crime
rate has benefited most New Yorkers. While the poor are
somewhat more likely than the rich to have been crime
victims in the prior year, their overall odds of victimization
are not much greater than those of other families. Differ-
ences are evident, however, in the type of victimization.
Poor families are only about half as likely as rich families to
have been subject to property crime in the form of having
their homes broken into. Their odds of having been the
victim of a robbery, in contrast, are four times greater.
Given these differences, it is not surprising that one-third of
the poorest New Yorkers feel that their neighborhoods are
unsafe and one-half rate their neighborhoods negatively.
We would hope that public services and supports
would offset these income-related forms of inequality. The
evidence for this, however, is not reassuring. In fact, the
poorest families are often the most disadvantaged in the
adequacy of institutional supports as well.
This is most notable in children’s health insurance.
Children in 20 percent of the poorest families lack health
Table 3
CHILD OUTCOMES BY POVERTY BY AGE
Outcome
Percentage 
Poor
Percentage 
Affluent
Odds Ratio:
Poor versus Affluent
Child disabled 
Age zero to five 3 3 1.0
Age six to seventeen 20 9 2.6
Child in fair to poor health
Age zero to five 5 5 1.0
Age six to fourteen 10 5 1.7
Source:  Garfinkel and Meyers (1999).
Note:  Group differences are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level.
Memo:
Unweighted number 287 435
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insurance; their odds of going uninsured are four times
greater than those in the most affluent families. It is not the
poorest families, however, but the near-poor families who
fare the worst in this dimension, with a full 30 percent
unable to insure their children. The problem remains most
acute for these families at the margin of self-sufficiency,
who often fall between the cracks of public programs and
employment-based insurance. Poorer families also do much
worse than their affluent counterparts in terms of educa-
tional resources for their children. Parents in 22 percent of
the poorest families rate their children’s school as unsafe
and/or providing poor education, in comparison with only
12 percent of parents in the most affluent families; children
in more than 80 percent of the poorest families are not
in formal child care, in contrast to 50 percent of their
counterparts in affluent families.
CONCLUSIONS
Taken together, these findings help explain why New
York, on “average,” is so different from the rest of the
country. The United States has more economic inequality
than virtually all other Western industrialized nations; and
among U.S. cities, New York City appears to be the most
unequal. Great inequality is not a new phenomenon for the
country or the city. The dramatic pulling apart of rich and
poor is new, however. In the last twenty years, as the rich
have gotten richer, economic and social policy changes have
left the poor further and further behind. New York stands
out among U.S. cities as being the most unequal and as
experiencing the greatest rise in inequality during this
period (Larin and McNichol 1997).
Whether this inequality matters—whether it is or
should be a shared concern for all New Yorkers—depends
in part on its concrete manifestations. It is not a surprise
that the poorest New Yorkers are worse off in their eco-
nomic and social living conditions. It may not be surprising
that the poorest New Yorkers are also worse off in terms
of their health and educational attainment. Evidence of
inequality in socially controlled external supports and
services—from schools and health insurance to police
protection—is more surprising and less defensible. Even if
we are no longer surprised by the existence of inequality
and hardship, the concrete manifestations and the magni-
tude of the difference between rich and poor New Yorkers
remain shocking.
LOOKING AHEAD
A major contribution of the New York City Social Indicators
Survey is to provide a rich description of the well-being of
New Yorkers and of the magnitude of income and concrete
inequality in the city. With each cross-sectional sample, we
will use the data to compare well-being across groups that
differ by demographic characteristics, family structure,
income, and other features. Over time, we will be able to
track whether well-being is converging or diverging for
these groups—that is, whether inequality is increasing or
declining. Because the survey includes a variety of measures of
individual- and family-level well-being, ranging from the
economic to the interpersonal and social, we will be able to
track inequality on multiple dimensions simultaneously
and to analyze the accumulation of advantage—and dis-
advantage—at the individual level.
Our ambitions go beyond description, in that we
hope to link changes in well-being and inequality to
changes in public policies. One key to this analysis is the
collection of data from a large representative sample of
households within a single “policy jurisdiction.” The
household level data in the SIS will be supplemented by
detailed information on changes in social policies and
programs in New York City and New York State.
Isolating the effects of policy change from other
factors that are likely to influence well-being and inequality—
such as changes in the local economy and job market—
will present the greatest methodological challenge. We
will capitalize on several features of the SIS design to
strengthen our ability to make causal interpretations. The
collection of data from repeated cross-sections of the entire
population will allow us to compare the situations of
individuals and families with those of similar respondents
in a different policy context. For example, to isolate the effects
of changing welfare eligibility rules and administration, we
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eligible for welfare in 1999 and families who are ineligible
in 1999 but who would have been eligible under the 1996
rules. Differences in the economic strategies and well-
being of these two groups will provide insight into the
effect of eligibility rule changes.
The challenges of measuring well-being and ine-
quality are vast. The opportunities to contribute to our
understanding of these issues are also great. The SIS project
represents one effort to push beyond the limitations of
current data sources in order to collect the data necessary
to answer questions not only about whether America is
becoming more or less unequal, but about what inequality
means in concrete terms and how government policies affect
its magnitude and consequences.162 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999 NOTES
ENDNOTES
1. Authors’ calculation, based on the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Survey, 1996-97.
2. Authors’ calculation, based on the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Survey, 1996-97.
3. Authors’ calculation, based on the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Survey, 1996-97.
4. Authors’ calculations, based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current
Population Survey (CPS), Asset Ownership of Household Report, 1993.
Measures of assets in the CPS are more extensive than those in the New
York City Social Indicators Survey, so the magnitude of the difference
between the United States and New York City may be exaggerated in
these comparisons. The low levels of home ownership in New York City
are consistent with the conclusion that a small proportion of New York
families has assets above $100,000. 
5. Authors’ calculations, based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current
Population Survey, Asset Ownership of Household Report, 1993. 
6. American Housing Survey, 1995 (Table 2-1).
7. Authors’ calculation, based on the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Survey, 1996-97.
8. U.S. Department of Agriculture Nationwide Food Consumption
Survey (NFCS): Decennial Survey, 1977-80; Supplemental Low-Income
Survey, 1987-88; U.S. Department of Agriculture Continuing Survey of
Food Intakes by Individuals (CSFII), 1985-86, 1989-91. For U.S.
households, food insufficiency (measured as family members going
hungry) remained steady, at 2 to 4 percent, between 1977 and 1991. 
9. American Housing Survey, 1995. Nationwide, 7.5 percent of
occupied homes have structural problems (holes in floor, open cracks in
the interior, exposed wiring); 5.0 percent have inadequate heating;
1.5 percent lack some or all plumbing facilities. 
10. American Housing Survey, 1995 (Table 2-3). This survey uses more
than one person per room as a measure of overcrowding; the New York
City Social Indicators Survey measure is based on rooms per person. 
11. New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Criminal
Justice Indicators by Percent Change: New York City, 1995-96. New York
experienced a 3 percent drop overall in reported crime, a 17 percent drop
in burglaries, and a 16 percent drop in robberies during this period. 
12. Authors’ calculations, based on the 1994 General Social Survey
(GSS). The GSS asked if the respondent was the victim of burglary or
robbery; the New York City Social Indicators Survey asks whether the
family was victimized. This may inflate our figure relative to the national
data. 
13. The Gallup Poll Monthly, Princeton, N.J.: no. 318, pp. 51-2; no. 339,
p. 20; no. 371, p. 37.
14. Current Population Reports; Dynamics of Economic Well-Being: Health
Insurance, 1993-95. Who Loses Coverage and for How Long? According to
1994 Survey of Income and Program Participation data, 21 percent of
adults lacked insurance for at least one month and 8 percent had no
insurance for the twelve-month period.REFERENCES
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